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ARGUMENT 
I. COMPETITION BETWEEN UP&L AND OTHER UTILITY SYSTEMS IS NOT A 
CONCERN IN THIS CASE. 
UAMPS' brief contains a lengthy discussion of the opin-
ion of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") concern-
ing the recent merger between UP&L and PacifiCorp. While the 
UP&L/PacifiCorp merger may be of great public interest, the 
merger has no bearing upon the issues presented in this appeal. 
In the FERC opinion, the Commission considered whether 
the proposed merger would "tend to lessen competition and create 
a monopoly" in the markets in which UP&L and other utilities com-
pete0 FERC Opinion, pp. 26-27. The Commission concluded that, 
with certain conditions to ameliorate potential adverse affects 
on competition, the proposed merger was "consistent with the pub-
lic interest". Id. pp. 38, 70. 
The FERC opinion determined that competition occurs 
between UP&L and other utilities in two different product 
markets—bulk power sales and transmission services. Id. p. 27. 
The present case does not involve either of those markets; it 
involves fifty-five retail customers, formerly served by UP&L, 
now annexed by Logan. 
In the FERC proceedings, the Commission was concerned 
that the merger would give the merged company strategic dominance 
-1-
over transmission facilities linking low-cost hydro-power from 
the Northwest to high-demand markets in the Southwest (Califor-
nia, Southern Nevada and the Desert Southwest). Jji. pp. 31, 34. 
To ameliorate these potential anti-competitive effects, the Com-
mission required the merged company to provide its competitors 
access to transmission capacity, and to allow those competitors 
to participate with the merged company in construction of addi-
tional transmission capacity. Id. pp. 43-46. 
The important point for this case is that the Commis-
sion identified the utilities in the Southwest (not UAMPS' or the 
other municipal power systems in Utah) as the potential victims 
of the merged company's strategic bottleneck. Moreover, the Com-
mission identified no harmful effects upon competition for retail 
customers (the type of customer involved in this case). Indeed, 
utility systems do not typically compete with each other for 
retail customers. Even though public policy encourages competi-
tion in the markets for bulk power and transmission services, 
public policy remains in favor of regulated monopoly at the 
retail level. 
UAMPS cannot show that UP&L's interpretation of Section 
424 would foster anti-competitive practices. Section 424 is lim-
ited to annexations, and annexations typically involve small num-
bers of retail customers. The result in this case will have 
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little, if any, effect on the markets in which UP&L competes with 
other utilities. 
To conclude, the issue here is not one of competition 
between utility systems for bulk power sales and transmission 
services. The issue here is the amount of compensation that a 
municipal utility must pay when it uses annexation to expand into 
UP&L's retail customer base. UP&L is not seeking a competitive 
advantage over the municipal systems. It only seeks fair compen-
sation for the erosion of its customer base. 
II. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT A LITERAL INTERPRETATION OF 
SECTION 424 WOULD FORECLOSE MUNICIPAL EXPANSION. 
UAMPS asserts that UP&L's position in this case would 
place an unreasonable restriction upon municipal growth. UAMPS 
pronounces "it is, after all, an economic reality that in adopt-
ing a measure of damages as suggested by UP&L the right of (a 
municipality to serve annexed customers) . . . will likely be 
foreclosed." UAMPS1 Brief, p. 14. UAMPS cites no evidence in 
support of this proposition, other than Logan's claim that reve-
nues from the annexed customers may be insufficient to recover 
the cost of reimbursing UP&L for all of its dedicated facilities. 
The problem with UAMPS' argument is that it assumes the same con-
ditions will exist in every annexation to which Section 424 might 
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apply. Because Logan presented no evidence on this question, 
this court has no way of verifying that assumption. 
More importantly, UAMPS1 argument ignores the fact that 
economic inefficiencies are bound to occur when one utility 
forces another out of a service area. Both utilities have capac-
ity to serve the disputed territory. Either the former utility 
must bear the cost of stranded capacity, or the new utility must 
reimburse the former utility for capacity the new utility cannot 
use. Section 424 demonstrates that the Utah Legislature has 
selected the later option, based on the principle that the munic-
ipality desiring to expand its system should bear these ineffi-
ciencies, not the utility being forced out. 
The court must also consider the constitutional impera-
tive. UP&L is entitled to just compensation for any taking or 
deprivation of its facilities, regardless of whether the transac-
tion will be profitable for the entity engaged in the taking. 
UAMPS, like Logan, trumpets the right of a municipality to pro-
vide utility service to its citizens. Yet UAMPS fails to offer 
any coherent theory to explain why UP&Lfs constitutional right to 
receive just compensation in this case must take a back seat to 
Logan's municipal expansion plans. 
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III. THE FACT THAT SECTION 424 IS NOT A "CONDEMNATION STATUTE" 
DOES NOT DIMINISH UP&L'S RIGHT TO COMPENSATION FOR PROPERTY 
TAKEN. 
While conceding (as it must) that UP&L is entitled to 
just compensation for its dedicated facilities, UAMPS neverthe-
less argues that principles of compensation in eminent domain 
cases have no application in this case. UAMPS is really arguing 
that by taking of property under the auspices of Section 424, the 
municipality somehow can pay less than it would have paid had it 
proceeded under the power of eminent domain. 
UAMPS buttresses this argument with the observation 
that Utah does not have a statute specifically authorizing a 
municipality to condemn an existing utility system. From this 
fact, UAMPS concludes that the Legislature must have intended to 
substitute proceedings under Section 424 for traditional eminent 
domain powers. 
Unfortunately, the legislative history on this point is 
not as clear as UAMPS suggests. It is true that Senator Barton 
(not one of the sponsors) stated that Section 424 "doesn't even 
speak to eminent domain." Transcript of Senate Debate on S.B. 
No. 191, 1985 Legis., p. 5; (Ex. D-5). However Senator Matheson 
was worried that the bill had the same effect as a condemnation 
statute when he observed: 
If I happen to be the utility, then, I don't have any 
right. I've got sell without condemnation. What I am 
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saying is if you're going to do that, you ought to have 
to go to condemnation if he don't want to settle, and 
then go through all the procedure of why, and determine 
really what's the value. 
Id. p. 7. Senator Renstrom, although less concerned with the 
utility company's rights, agreed that Section 424 basically is a 
condemnation bill: 
I don't know why we have to be so concerned about the 
electric companies having their property taken by some 
form of eminent domain, whether we call it that in this 
bill or not. They don't hesitate to take it with the 
power that they have through the power of eminent 
domain, and to come across my property and Clyde's 
property and take it by eminent domain. I don't know 
why we should be so sensitive that under this bill we 
might be doing the same thing to them. 
Id. p. 8. 
The legislative history does not reveal if the senators 
ever resolved whether Section 424 could serve as a means to con-
demn utility facilities. One thing is clear, however. Nothing 
in the legislative history suggests that the measure of compensa-
tion under the statute would be less than the measure of compen-
sation under eminent domain, if the statute were used to take 
private property. 
In a sense, UP&L agrees with Senator Barton and UAMPS 
that Section 424 does not speak to the power of eminent domain. 
That is why UP&L contends that Section 424 does not give Logan 
possession of UP&L's local distribution facilities. The fact 
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remains, however, that Logan has used Section 424 to expropriate 
UP&L's distribution facilities in the annexed areas. Unless the 
court orders the return of those facilities, UP&L is entitled, at 
a minimum, to the full constitutional measure of compensation. 
IV. UAMPS FAILS TO ESTABLISH THAT SECTION 424 IS LIMITED TO 
FACILITIES LOCATED IN THE ANNEXED AREAS. 
In its arguments concerning the proper measure of com-
pensation, UAMPS assumes (as does Logan) that Section 424 applies 
only to facilities located in the annexed area. UAMPS offers no 
argument to explain why the term "dedicated facilities" must be 
distorted to mean "facilities located in the annexed area". 
UAMPS relies upon a remark by Senator Sowards that the purpose of 
the bill is to provide for compensation for facilities in the 
annexed area. By singling out this remark, UAMPS implies that 
Senator Sowards did not intend compensation for dedicated facili-
ties outside the annexed area. The full text of Senator Soward's 
remarks, however, demonstrate that he intended the bill to cover 
all dedicated facilities, not just those in the annexed area. 
See Brief of Appellant, pp. 20-23; Transcript of Senate Debate on 
H.B. 354, 1983 Legis., p. 1 (Ex. D-8). 
UAMPS also questions the methods UP&L used to value its 
generation, substation and other facilities. UAMPS apparently 
forgets that Logan elected not to contest UP&L's valuation 
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methods. Logan simply argued as a matter of law that UP&L was 
not entitled to recover anything for facilities outside the 
annexed area. Pre-Trial Order, para. V.C (R. 485). Therefore, 
UP&L's valuation methods cannot be challenged on appeal. More-
over, UAMPS1 status as amicus curiae limits it to arguing only 
the issues that the parties raised. In Re: State in Interest of 
Woodward, 14 Utah 2d 336, 384 P.2d 110 (1963). Logan has not 
raised the issue of UP&L's valuation methods. 
CONCLUSION 
UAMPS has not raised any substantial arguments against 
UP&L's positions in this appeal. UP&L urges the court to grant 
the relief requested in UP&L's earlier briefs. 
DATED this — ' *- day of June, 1989. 
W. Cullen Battle 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
a Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant 
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